MUTUAL CAUSATION BETWEEN BODY AND BRAIN

GAVIN BRELSTAFF – CRS4 in Sardinia & ALEXANDRA BRELSTAFF – Univ. of Cagliari Italy.

gjb@crs4.it

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Abstract

Mutual Causation has received relatively little attention since Frankel's¹ analysis demoted it as practical possibility. Indeed its absence is implicit in the increasing application of **Structural Causal Models** to represent causal relations between conscious perceptive states, brain states and report states – as exemplified in the account of **Bernroider**². [...]



Here: $(\mathbf{a} \perp \mathbf{b} \mid \mathbf{c})$ means \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} are *independent conditional* on \mathbf{c} .

For the **"Emotional"** case: **Brain State** and **Conscious Perceptive State** become **independent conditional** on **Report State** – providing a clean separation between between Brain and Conscious Awareness, provided the individual has the capacity to make report, bodily or through language. This interpretation thus aligns with: (1) Mental processes *supervening*, rather than intervening, in neuronal physiology (Dewar 1976); (2) consciousness as an evolved *user illusion* conditional on an individual's capacity to report their reasoning (Dennett)³.

Yet does this make sense from a developmental stand-point? Do infants really have zero consciousness until they develop a capacity to report coherently to others, and then themselves? The Table⁴ below illustrates how algorithmic substrates may align with infant development.

Evolutionary mechanism	Trial & Error	Natural Selection / genetic replication					Memetic replic Language, Thir	Memetic replication, Language, Thinking tools	
Dennett's Creature		Darwinian		Skinnerian		Popperian	Gregorian		
Algorithmic substrates		Representational Learning Reinforcement Learning							
		Predictive Coding / Bayesian networks							
					Nested Virtual Machines				
Infant development			CONCEPTION	Reflexive agency	BIRTH	Sensor-motor stage	Preoperational stage	Hands-on- Science	
Comprehension	Competence without comprehension		Implicit spatio-temporal		Explicit spatial Implicit temporal	Explicit spatio-tempora	Scientific l knowledge		

The **Predictive Coding** substrate provides automated formation of hypotheses – which, when reported/shared, ask an evidential **grounding**.

If **sentience** precedes full consciousness (e.g. during the developmental **sensor-motor phase**) it could constitute an ontological grounding – by which information may be transformed into knowledge through experiential learning.

If **sentience**-based grounding **causes** information within a **Brain State** to become knowledge while at the same time **reported** knowledge **causes** a **Conscious Perceptive State** there may be a case for considering **Mutual Causation** rather than reducing matters to SCMs derived from DAGs. There might be a "resonant loop between body states and brain states" as Damasio puts it⁵.

¹ Lois Frankel, 1986, Mutual causation, simultaneity and event description, *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, vol 49, 3, p.361-372.

² Gustav Bernroider, 2017, Neural transition dynamics and conscious perceptive states, in *Biophysics of Consciousness: A Foundational Approach* eds. R.R. Poznanski, J.A. Tuszynski and T.E. Feinberg, p.251-277.

³ Daniel C. Dennett, From Bacteria To Bach and Back, Norton, New York NY, 2017. See Chapters. 6 &14

⁴ Gavin & A Brelstaff, A Touch of Grounding, Luminous Workshop page 8--11 - 2019

⁵ Antonio Damasio, 2010, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain, Pantheon New York NY, p.116.